您現(xiàn)在的位置:首頁 - 雅思 - 答疑

雅思閱讀素材_Banks' exposures

2024-08-03 16:32:55 來源:中國教育在線

隨著全球化的加速和教育的多樣化,越來越多的學(xué)生選擇留學(xué),而在申請國外大學(xué)時(shí),語言考試是繞不開的一環(huán),本文和大家說一說:雅思閱讀素材:Banks' exposures,一起往下來看看吧。

雅思閱讀素材:Banks' exposures

雅思閱讀:Unlike in 2008, banks' exposures are there for all to see

THERE are worrying similarities between 2008 and today as indicators point to another interbank lending freeze. But there also some important differences: credit bubbles are deflated, housing prices adjusted, private debt reduced and, last but not least, banks have started to deleverage their balance sheets, mainly by strengthening their capital and reserves; even in Europe, banks have increased their capital by more than 20% on average since Lehman.

However, the decisive difference is with regard to the distribution and probability of expected losses, resulting in 2008 mainly from housing loans but today from government debt.

In 2008, losses resulting from the subprime and securitisation debacle were a done deal; there was (and still is) no quick remedy to revive the housing market. But what was unclear was the exposure of each bank to these toxic assets, especially as exposure came not in plain vanilla but in wrapped and structured style. Governments' task was to make sure that banks could withstand the losses that were bound to hit the banks. Not knowing which banks were most exposed, they offered a wide range of public support to all of them.

Today, the exposure of each bank to government debt is there for all to see, thanks to the last round of the European banking stress tests. But writedowns on these assets are far from clear (except in the case of Greek bonds); it depends entirely on the actions of policymakers. It is in their hands to avoid default.

A prepare for the worst approach, i.e. a preventive recapitalisation of all banks as in 2008, therefore seems less convincing. For two reasons: firstly, it is rather bizarre that governments should use public money to recapitalise banks, forcing them to build a capital buffer against public defaultan event that only becomes more likely if governments have to channel so much money into banks to protect them against it. Sounds rather absurd.

Secondly, a default of, say, Italy would be financial Armageddon. Bolstering capital buffers to hold out against such a shockwave would be like re-arranging the deckchairs on the Titanic. There is no reasonable amount of capital that could protect banks against it.

Simply more capital is not the solution. This is also evidenced by the woes of Dexiawhich would pass even the toughest stress test (thanks to a high capital ratio) but is nonetheless a failed bank because its business model lacks a stable funding base. The lesson is clear: as long as investors fear further writedowns on government debt, a high capital ratio will not dispel such mistrust.

It is more convincing to tackle the root of the problem. The EFSF should be put to better use than tossing more money at the banks. Governments should instead eliminate the risk that such a need could ever arise. In other words, they have to quash the probability of sovereign default in the euro zone, neutralise the Greek factor and make sure that all other countrieswhich face liquidity problems but are not insolventwill honour their debt. Besides meaningful consolidation and reform efforts, that requires an efficient crisis management mechanism to stop contagion. In that respect, the most promising idea is to allow the EFSF, and then its permanent successor the ESM, to function as a bond insurer. Only then, will investors' distrust towards banks be lifted.

The bottom line: after Lehman, governments around the world did a terrific job in supporting banks, leading to an astonishingly quick recovery of the banking world (also in terms of profits and bonuses). This time around, the ineffective efforts to resolve the euro crisis let the banks down. Now, they have to bear the brunt. But a larger scale banking crisis can still be avoided. All that is required? Decisive action by policymakers to finally curb the sovereign debt crisis.

以上,就是本文的全部內(nèi)容分享,希望能給同學(xué)們帶來參考,如果您還有雅思閱讀素材:Banks' exposures其他方面的疑問,歡迎隨時(shí)在線咨詢客服老師。

>> 雅思 托福 免費(fèi)測試、量身規(guī)劃、讓英語學(xué)習(xí)不再困難<<

- 聲明 -

(一)由于考試政策等各方面情況的不斷調(diào)整與變化,本網(wǎng)站所提供的考試信息僅供參考,請以權(quán)威部門公布的正式信息為準(zhǔn)。

(二)本網(wǎng)站在文章內(nèi)容出處標(biāo)注為其他平臺的稿件均為轉(zhuǎn)載稿,轉(zhuǎn)載出于非商業(yè)性學(xué)習(xí)目的,歸原作者所有。如您對內(nèi)容、版 權(quán)等問題存在異議請與本站聯(lián)系,會及時(shí)進(jìn)行處理解決。

語言考試咨詢
HOT
培訓(xùn)費(fèi)用測算
英語水平測試
1
免費(fèi)在線咨詢
免費(fèi)獲取留學(xué)方案
在線咨詢
英語自測
留學(xué)方案
關(guān)注公眾號
  • 麗雅老師
  • 小皮老師
  • 小倩老師
  • 小雅老師